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THE DANGER IN NEW MEXICO’S METHOD OF
DECIDING WHETHER AN OUT-OF-STATE
CONVICTION IS A REGISTRABLE SEX OFFENSE
Sam Ashman*

ABSTRACT
Plea offers present criminal defendants with the option of
acquiescing to specific punitive or rehabilitative measures rather
than allowing judges and juries to determine those measures at
trial. Defendants often accept plea offers over going to trial
because a plea agreement provides the comfort of knowing what
consequences to expect. However, in cases involving sexual
misconduct, it is more difficult to anticipate the consequences of
plea agreements. All fifty states maintain sex-offender registries
with varying criteria for when a resident must register. In 2013,
the New Mexico Supreme Court decided State v. Hall and held that
it may be necessary for courts to examine the facts supporting
residents’ out-of-state convictions when deciding whether New
Mexico law requires those residents to register as sex offenders.
The decision in Hall makes it possible for New Mexico to require
new residents to register as sex offenders even when they did not
know that their pleas could have had such consequences. This Note
argues that New Mexico courts should not engage in a factspecific inquiry when deciding whether an out-of-state conviction
is a registrable sex offense because doing so offends an interest in
protecting the voluntariness of defendants’ pleas. Instead, this
Note suggests that courts should defer to other states’ decisions as
to whether a particular crime was a registrable sex offense.
INTRODUCTION
When negotiating a plea bargain, how much thought should defense
attorneys give to the civil consequences of conviction? In cases involving sexual
misconduct, when should defense counsel advise the client of the civil sanction of
registering as a sex offender, and of what should that advice consist?

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2020. I would like to thank my parents, Peggy
Gaustad and Stuart Ashman, for their endless support; Professors Carol Suzuki and Walker Boyd, and the
editorial staff of the New Mexico Law Review, for their instruction and guidance; and Alicia Lopez, of
Rothstein Donatelli LLP, whose zealous advocacy inspired this Note.
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Suppose Jones pleads guilty to indecent exposure in violation of section 309-14 of the New Mexico Criminal Code,1 a misdemeanor that does not require
registration as a sex offender in New Mexico.2 Should Jones’s lawyer advise him of
the possibility that another state may require him to register as a sex offender upon
moving there? Suppose further that, years later, Jones decides to move to North
Dakota. After some time, he receives notice that he must register as a sex offender
because of his conviction in New Mexico.3 If Jones’s attorney did not inform him
that North Dakota, among several other states, treats indecent exposure as a
registrable sex offense,4 can Jones withdraw his guilty plea in the New Mexico case
on a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel?
This Note demonstrates a problem with New Mexico’s method of
determining whether an out-of-state conviction is a registrable sex offense. Part I
explains the motivations behind New Mexico’s Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) and the New Mexico Supreme Court case State v. Hall,
which promulgated a fact-intensive inquiry for determining whether an out-of-state
crime is a SORNA offense.5 Part II discusses the duties of criminal defense attorneys
regarding SORNA by comparison to the duty to advise clients of the immigration
consequences of conviction. In New Mexico, defense counsel has an affirmative duty
to advise clients about SORNA in cases where registration is a near-certain
consequence of a plea of guilty or no contest.6 Reasoning from the New Mexico
standard for effective assistance of counsel, Part III illustrates how claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel become viable when states determine that out-ofstate crimes are registrable sex offenses based on the crimes’ underlying facts. The
Note concludes by positing a two-step inquiry to replace the fact-specific inquiry
promulgated in Hall.
I.

BACKGROUND

In 1994, Jesse Timmendequas raped and killed seven-year-old Megan
Kanka in the neighborhood they shared in Hamilton Township, New Jersey.7
Timmendequas had previously served time in prison for sexual assault, and the case
inspired outrage at the notion that Megan’s family did not have notice of
Timmendequas’s criminal history.8 The New Jersey Legislature was quick to
respond with Megan’s Law, establishing a framework for sex-offender registration
and community notification within the State.9 Soon after, the federal government
1. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-14 (2018).
2. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-3 (2013).
3. Cf. Denault v. State, 2017 ND 167, ¶ 2, 898 N.W.2d 452, 454.
4. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-15(1)(g) (West 2008) (including the state’s indecent
exposure statute, section 12.1-20-12.1, among the enumerated offenses in the definition of “sexual
offender”).
5. State v. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 18, 30, 294 P.3d 1235.
6. State v. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-043, ¶ 31, 157 P.3d 56.
7. See generally State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1999).
8. Jan Hoffman, New Law is Urged on Freed Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/04/nyregion/new-law-is-urged-on-freed-sex-offenders.html.
9. Megan’s Law, 1994 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 133 (West) (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 2015)).
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conditioned states’ receipt of some federal crime-prevention funding on states
instituting a system like that in New Jersey.10
The New Mexico Legislature responded in 1995 by passing the first
iteration of SORNA.11 The Act imposes a duty on sex offenders to register with the
sheriff in the county where they reside12 and declares that the New Mexico
Department of Public Safety shall maintain a website for public access to information
on sex offenders living in the state.13 New Mexico courts have upheld SORNA under
both state and federal constitutional scrutiny.14 In State v. Druktenis, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that SORNA was not an ex post facto law,15 and that it did not
violate the defendant’s substantive or procedural due process rights under rationalbasis scrutiny.16 Moreover, the court construed SORNA as a “civil, remedial,
regulatory, nonpunitive law.”17 Therefore, as a nonpunitive law, SORNA does not
implicate the U.S. Constitution’s procedural protections for criminal defendants.
SORNA requires registration of any “sex offender,”18 defined as a person
convicted of any one of twelve enumerated offenses, or an attempt to commit one of
the first eleven.19 Additionally, SORNA requires registration of any person convicted
of a crime in another jurisdiction that is “equivalent” to any one of New Mexico’s
enumerated sex offenses.20 Every state provides a means of comparing other states’
crimes to its own for the purpose of determining whether a foreign conviction is a
registrable sex offense.21 Statutes in California and Wyoming explicitly provide that
10. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038–42 (1994), amended by Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20962).
11. Sex Offender Registration Act, 1995 N.M. Laws 106 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-11A (2013)).
12. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-4(B) (2013).
13. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-5.1(E) (2013).
14. State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 37–38, 86 P.3d 1050.
15. Id.
16. Id. ¶ 116.
17. Id. ¶ 32.
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-4(A) (2013).
19. Id. § 29-11A-3(H)–(I).
20. Id. § 29-11A-3(I).
21. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(b)(3) (West 2015) (treating as registrable any out-of-state offenses
that are “similar” to New Jersey’s enumerated sex offenses); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(b)(7) (West
2017) (treating “comparable” offenses as registrable); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178C (West 2016)
(treating “like violations” as registrable); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-502(9)(b) (West 2009) (treating
“reasonably equivalent” offenses as registrable); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-4.5(a)(22) (West 2016)
(treating “substantially equivalent” offenses as registrable); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.722(w)(viii)
(West 2012) (treating “substantially similar” offenses as registrable); see also ALA. CODE § 15-20A-5(35)
(2018); ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(6) (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(A) (2010); ARK. CODE.
ANN. § 12-12-903(13)(A)(iii) (2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.005(a) (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-22-103(1)(b) (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-253(a) (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4121(a)(4)(c) (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(1)(h)(1)(a)(I) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-12(a)(20)(B) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-1 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE § 188304(1)(b)–(c) (2019); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(C) (2016); IOWA CODE. ANN. § 692A.101(27) (West
2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.500(8)(c) (West 2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:541(24)(a) (2012); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11203(6)(C) (2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-701(l)(2) (West
2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b(a)(4) (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-23(h)(xxi)
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the facts underlying the foreign conviction may determine whether the crime is
equivalent to one of the state’s registrable sex offenses.22 In several other states,
including New Mexico, courts have reasoned it appropriate to consider the facts in
determining whether a foreign conviction equates to one of the reviewing state’s
registrable sex offenses.23
a.

The case: State v. Hall.

In State v. Hall, the defendant, while living in California, pleaded guilty to
“annoying or molesting a child younger than eighteen” in violation of section
647.6(a)(1) of the California Penal Code.24 “Annoying or molesting a child younger
than eighteen” is an enumerated sex offense in California,25 so the defendant had to
register as a sex offender as a result of pleading guilty.26 The defendant moved to
New Mexico in 2006.27 SORNA provides that a sex offender who changes residence
to New Mexico must register with the county sheriff within five days of arrival.28
(2019); MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400(1)(7) (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4003(1)(a)(ii), (b)(ii)
(West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.097(1)(u) (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651B:1(V)(b) (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-3(I) (2013); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a(2)(d) (McKinney
2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.6(4)(b) (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-15(1)(g)
(West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01(A)(12) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 582(B)
(West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163A.005(6)(c) (West 2015); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9799.14(b)(21), (c)(17), (d)(13) (West 2014); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-2(k) (2019); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-3-430(A) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-1(16) (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39202(19) (2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(5)(H) (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-41102(17)(b), (d) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5401(10)(C) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1902(A)(5) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030(47)(d) (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
15-12-2(b) (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(1d)(am) (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19301(a)(viii)(B) (2019).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.005(a) (West 2018) (treating out-of-state convictions as registrable
“based on the elements of the convicted offense or facts admitted by the person or found true by the trier
of fact”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-301(a)(viii)(B) (2019) (treating as registrable any out-of-state
convictions “containing the same or similar elements, or arising out of the same or similar facts or
circumstances” as criminalized by a Wyoming sex offense).
23. E.g., State v. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶ 18, 294 P.3d 1235 (“To determine equivalence, courts
must look beyond the elements of the conviction to the defendant’s actual conduct.”); North v. Bd. of
Exam’rs of Sex Offenders, 871 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (N.Y. 2007) (“In circumstances where the offenses
overlap but the foreign offense also criminalizes conduct not covered under the New York offense, the
Board must review the conduct underlying the foreign conviction to determine if that conduct is, in fact,
within the scope of the New York offense.”); State v. Lloyd, 132 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2012-Ohio-2015, 970
N.E.2d 870, at ¶ 31(“If the out-of-state statute defines the offense in such a way that the court cannot
discern from a comparison of the statutes whether the offenses are substantially equivalent, a court may
go beyond the statutes and rely on a limited portion of the record in a narrow class of cases where the
factfinder was required to find all the elements essential to a conviction under the listed Ohio statute.”);
State v. Howe, 212 P.3d 565, 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Morley, 952 P.2d 167, 175–76
(Wash. 1998)) (“‘[I]f the elements are not identical, or the foreign statute is broader than the Washington
definition of the particular crime,’ then, as a second step, the trial court may examine the facts of the outof-state crime.”).
24. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶ 2; CAL. PENAL CODE § 647.6(a)(1) (West 2018).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(c) (West 2018).
26. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶ 2.
27. Id.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-4(B) (2013).
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The defendant failed to do so, and, in 2008, the state charged him for failing to
register as a sex offender.29
The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea on the charge of failure to
register as a sex offender, preserving the opportunity to appeal the finding that his
California conviction was a registrable sex offense in New Mexico.30 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals compared California’s annoying-or-molesting-a-childyounger-than-eighteen statute to New Mexico’s criminal-contact-of-a-minor statute
and held that the two crimes were not equivalent, reasoning that they had different
elements.31 The court of appeals thus held that New Mexico’s laws did not require
that the defendant register as a sex offender.32
On writ of certiorari, the attorney general argued that the New Mexico
Supreme Court should consider the conduct underlying the defendant’s California
conviction to determine whether his crime was equivalent to the New Mexico crime
of criminal contact of a minor.33 The court agreed with the attorney general and
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.34 The New Mexico Supreme Court held
that “courts must look beyond the elements” of the out-of-state crime and consider
the defendant’s actual conduct in determining whether a foreign conviction is
equivalent to one of New Mexico’s enumerated sex offenses.35 The court reasoned
that it owed broad construction to SORNA to help facilitate the Act’s remedial
purpose.36
Hall established a two-step inquiry for determining whether a foreign
conviction is a registrable sex offense in New Mexico.37 Courts must first compare
the elements of the foreign crime to those of the nearest New Mexico sex offense.38
If the elements are the same, then the defendant must register as a sex offender.39
When the elements are not the same, courts should proceed to the second step of the
inquiry and analyze whether the defendant’s conduct would have satisfied the
elements of a New Mexico sex offense, had the conduct occurred in New Mexico.40
Applying its new analysis, the court held that the record was insufficient to
determine whether the defendant’s conduct satisfied the elements of the New Mexico
crime of criminal contact of a minor.41 The court thus granted the defendant leave to
withdraw his guilty plea on the charge of failure to register as a sex offender.42

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶¶ 18, 30.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 18, 30.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 30.
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ANALYSIS

New Mexico is not the only state to embrace a fact-specific inquiry in
determining whether an out-of-state crime is a registrable sex offense under the
state’s own laws. However, other states’ reasoning for doing so appears to be aimed
at protecting defendants’ rights. In support of its holding in Hall, the New Mexico
Supreme Court cited New York as another jurisdiction subscribing to the factspecific approach.43 But in the New York case, the court reasoned that the facts
underlying a defendant’s out-of-state conviction are reviewable only when the
foreign crime is broader than the comparable New York statute.44 New York’s factspecific inquiry thus operates to register fewer people by avoiding registration of
new residents whose prior conduct does not fall within the scope of a New York sex
offense. In contrast, New Mexico’s reasoning for adopting a fact-specific inquiry
was to register more potential-recidivist sex offenders rather than fewer.45
The decision in Hall authorizes New Mexico courts to adjudicate a person
a sex offender by hypothesizing that the facts of an out-of-state conviction would
have supported a conviction under a different statute had the events occurred in New
Mexico. If sex-offender registration were considered punishment, this sort of inquiry
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, as it would cause a person to be “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”
for the same offense.46 If sex-offender registration were punitive, the fact-specific
inquiry might also violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property” based on the record of another state’s
judgment, without adequate procedure.47 But, because sex-offender registration is
nonpunitive,48 the U.S. Constitution permits the fact-specific inquiry that the New
Mexico Supreme Court put forth in Hall. Nonetheless, the fact-specific inquiry is
problematic for its effect on defense attorneys’ ability to meet standards for effective
assistance of counsel.
a.

New Mexico protects the right of criminal defendants to effective
assistance of counsel.

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a right to assistance of counsel.49 In Strickland v. Washington, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the minimum assistance required is that of
“reasonably effective assistance,” and established a two-pronged test: counsel is
ineffective if (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.”50 In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court held that the
Strickland test applies to cases where the defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. ¶ 21.
North v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Sex Offenders, 871 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (N.Y. 2007).
Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 16–18.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 32, 86 P.3d 1050.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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on a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel.51 The relevant question in such cases
is whether the defendant entered the plea agreement as the result of a “voluntary and
intelligent choice.”52 Application of the Strickland test answers that question because
the “voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice ‘was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’”53
New Mexico courts follow Strickland and Hill in determining whether an
attorney provided competent representation in an earlier case.54 New Mexico’s court
rules prohibit a trial court from accepting a defendant’s guilty plea without first
establishing that the defendant understands certain penal and civil consequences of
conviction.55 And a defendant’s comprehension of those consequences is dependent
upon the advice of counsel. Hence, when a defendant enters a guilty plea without
truly understanding its consequences, responsibility lies with the defendant’s
attorney.56 Defense counsel’s performance is deficient, establishing the first prong
of the Strickland test, when it is responsible for a defendant’s failure to comprehend
the consequences of conviction.57 The following section demonstrates attorneys’
responsibilities regarding the civil consequences of conviction through a discussion
of defense counsel’s duty to advise clients on the immigration consequences of
pleading guilty or no contest.
1.

The standard for effective assistance of counsel regarding adverse
immigration consequences: State v. Paredez and its progeny.

In cases where deportation is a near-certain consequence of a plea
agreement, defense counsel is under an obligation to inform clients of that reality. In
State v. Paredez, defense counsel advised the defendant that entering a plea
agreement on a charge of criminal sexual contact of a minor “could” affect his
immigration status.58 Criminal sexual contact of a minor is an aggravated felony
under federal law,59 and a noncitizen with an aggravated felony conviction is subject
to deportation without discretionary relief.60 Therefore, deportation was a nearcertain consequence of the plea agreement.61 Because deportation was a near-certain
consequence of the plea agreement, defense counsel misrepresented the
consequences of conviction in advising the defendant that pleading guilty “could”
affect his immigration status. The court thus held that defense counsel’s performance
was deficient in failing to convey the near certainty of deportation.62 The Paredez

51. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
52. Id. at 56 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).
53. Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
54. E.g., State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 13, 101 P.3d 799.
55. Rule 5-303(F) NMRA.
56. See Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 12 (reasoning that the trial court’s failure to instruct the
defendant on the immigration consequences of conviction did not relieve his attorney of a responsibility
to have done so).
57. See, e.g., id. ¶ 19.
58. Id. ¶ 2.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
60. Id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a).
61. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 4.
62. Id. ¶ 15.
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decision established an affirmative duty of counsel to determine the “specific
immigration consequences of pleading guilty” so that the client may knowingly and
voluntarily decide whether to enter a guilty plea.63
The progeny of Paredez demonstrates that New Mexico’s standard for
effective assistance of counsel is broader than the federal standard as it relates to the
immigration consequences of pleading guilty. Six years after Paredez, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky and established the federal standard for
effective assistance of counsel in cases where deportation is a likely result of a plea
agreement.64 In Padilla, the Court held that defense counsel is under a duty to inform
clients of the immigration consequences of conviction when those consequences are
“truly clear.”65 However, the Court also held that it is sufficient to advise clients that
pleading guilty or no contest may carry adverse immigration consequences in
situations where the potential consequences are not “truly clear.”66 In State v. Favela,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals observed that the Paredez decision has no such
caveat.67
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Paredez court declined to invert the
proposition that defense counsel must advise clients as to the immigration
consequences of conviction when those consequences are nearly certain. 68 Under
Paredez, defense counsel must make an effort to predict the specific immigration
consequences of conviction; warning that a client may face adverse consequences is
never enough.69 Defense counsel has a similar duty to inform clients of the potential
consequence of sex-offender registration.
2.

The standard for effective assistance of counsel regarding sexoffender registration: the extension of Paredez in State v. Edwards.

While, incidentally, Paredez arose from a sex offense, the case did not
involve defense counsel’s duty to advise the defendant as to the requirements of
SORNA. Where registration as a sex offender is or may be a consequence of a plea
agreement, defense counsel is under an obligation to advise the client of that fact:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first, by
addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing the defendant of and
determining that the defendant understands . . . that, if the defendant pleads guilty or
no contest to a crime for which registration as a sex offender is or may be required,
and, if the defendant is represented by counsel, the court shall determine that the
defendant has been advised by counsel of the registration requirement under the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act.70
When sex-offender registration is a near-certain consequence of a plea
agreement, as when adverse immigration consequences are nearly certain, defense
63. Id. ¶ 19.
64. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
65. Id. at 368–69.
66. Id. at 369.
67. State v. Favela, 2013-NMCA-102, ¶ 18, 311 P.3d 1213.
68. Id.
69. State v. Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 147 P.3d 897 (reading Paredez as “stating a general rule”
requiring defense counsel to make “a definite prediction as to the likelihood of deportation”).
70. Rule 5-303(F)(7) NMRA.
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counsel is under a duty to provide specific advice. In State v. Edwards, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals extended Paredez to cases where sex-offender registration
is a potential consequence of a plea agreement.71 Edwards established an affirmative
duty of counsel to advise defendants as to the requirements of SORNA in cases
where a guilty plea “will almost certainly” result in the defendant having to register
as a sex offender.72 In such cases, counsel must, at minimum, advise the defendant
as to sections 29-11A-4, 4.1, 5, 5.1, and 7 of SORNA,73 “as well as the likely social
consequences of being a registered sex offender.”74 Hence, counsel must address the
duty to register, the procedure for registering, the information retained by the
department of public safety, public access to the registry, and the procedure one must
follow in moving from New Mexico to another state.75
State v. Cunningham, a 2018 New Mexico Court of Appeals decision,
illustrates the duty of counsel under Edwards.76 In Cunningham, the defendant
sought to withdraw his plea of no contest on a charge of criminal sexual contact of a
minor in the fourth degree.77 The defendant claimed that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to inform him that pleading no
contest would require him to register as a sex offender.78 At the hearing in which the
defendant pleaded no contest, the district court determined that the defendant had not
been advised as to the requirements of SORNA.79 The judge ordered a thirty-second
recess for defense counsel to so advise the defendant, after which the district court
accepted the defendant’s plea.80 Hearing the defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the court of appeals reasoned that thirty seconds was
insufficient time to provide the minimum advice required under Edwards.81 The
court thus found defense counsel’s performance deficient,82 satisfying the first prong
of the Strickland test.
In creating a heightened standard for effective assistance of counsel in sexoffense cases, the Edwards court took account of the social stigma attached to the
label “sex offender.”83 The social consequences of sex-offender registration can be
severe. Consider the experience of a woman on Michigan’s sex-offender registry
because she exposed herself to her stepsiblings and some of her elementary-school
classmates when she was ten years old.84 As a college student living in the dorms,

71. State v. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-043, ¶ 31, 157 P.3d 56.
72. Id.
73. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-4, -4.1, -5, -5.1, -7 (2013).
74. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-043, ¶ 31.
75. §§ 29-11A-4, -4.1, -5, -5.1, -7.
76. State v. Cunningham, No. A-1-CA-35540, 2018 WL 1801152 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018).
77. Id. ¶ 1.
78. Id. ¶ 12.
79. Id. ¶ 14.
80. Id.
81. Id. ¶ 15.
82. Id. ¶ 12.
83. State v. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-043, ¶ 25, 157 P.3d 56.
84. See generally Sarah Stillman, When Juveniles Are Found Guilty of Sexual Misconduct, the SexOffender Registry Can Be a Life Sentence, NEW YORKER MAG. (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/when-kids-are-accused-of-sex-crimes.
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she faced harassment for her status as a registered sex offender, leading her to drop
out of school.85 When her status also prevented her from employment, she moved
into a homeless shelter.86 The public notification aspect of sex-offender registration
allows for—and perhaps encourages—the ostracism of those registered. Because the
consequences of sex-offender registration can be so severe, New Mexico asks more
of defense counsel when the client may have to register, as is the case when the client
may face deportation.87
Like the duty under Paredez, the duty under Edwards requires more than a
simple warning as to the potential for adverse civil consequences. Under Edwards,
defense counsel must determine the likelihood that a plea agreement will carry the
consequence of sex-offender registration. When the likelihood is great, defense
counsel must instruct the client on what sex-offender registration entails. In
determining the likelihood that a client will have to register as a sex offender, defense
counsel may have to take other states’ laws into account.
A.
The Edwards standard requires defense counsel to consider other states’
laws in determining whether a plea agreement carries the consequence of sexoffender registration.
Like the Paredez court, the Edwards court did not add a qualification to its
holding that allows for defense counsel to offer a mere warning as to the possibility
of adverse consequences when those consequences are not clear. By extending
Paredez to the context of sex-offender registration, Edwards requires defense
counsel to predict the likelihood that clients will be subject to registration; warning
that registration is a possibility is never enough. In making these predictions, defense
counsel must determine whether other states treat particular crimes as registrable sex
offenses, even when New Mexico does not.
Reconsider the hypothetical posed above in which Jones pleaded guilty to
indecent exposure, which is not a registrable sex offense in New Mexico. Indecent
exposure is a registrable offense in North Dakota, however, and when Jones happens
to move there, he receives notice that he must register as a sex offender. When Jones
entered his plea, it was not “truly clear” that it would require him to register as a sex
offender because he was living in New Mexico at the time. Therefore, under federal
standards, Jones does not have a claim to ineffective assistance of counsel so long as
his attorney mentioned the possibility of sex-offender registration.88 But under the
New Mexico standard, his attorney had to provide more affirmative advice. New
Mexico standards require that Jones’s attorney make a “definite prediction as to the
likelihood”89 that conviction will result in a requirement to register as a sex offender.
If Jones’s attorney failed to inform him that other states are likely to treat his
conviction as a registrable sex offense, then, under Edwards, Jones did not enter the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-043, ¶ 26 (“We see no reason why the similarly harsh consequences of
sex offender registration should not also necessitate specific advice from counsel so that defendants can
make informed decisions regarding their pleas.”).
88. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010) (creating a duty of counsel that only applies
when the civil consequences of conviction are “truly clear”).
89. State v. Carlos, 2006-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 147 P.3d 897 (interpreting Paredez).
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plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily. His attorney’s performance thus fails the
Strickland test for effective assistance of counsel because it did not provide Jones a
genuine opportunity to consider, in his decision to forgo trial, the likelihood that he
may have to register as a sex offender in another state.
B.

The Edwards standard is broad in scope: analogy to Ramirez v. State.

In Ramirez v. State, the defendant was arrested in a public park on drug
charges.90 In 1997, he pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor offenses including
possession of marijuana, in an amount under 30 grams, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.91 Twelve years later, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) informed the defendant that his 1997 convictions rendered him deportable
from the United States.92 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a
violation of any state law relating to a controlled substance is grounds for
deportation.93 However, the Department of Justice has discretion to waive
deportability based on “a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of
marijuana.”94 USCIS informed the defendant that he was not eligible for the waiver
because he had admitted guilt on two charges relating to a controlled substance,95
even though both violations arose from the same conduct.
When the defendant entered the 1997 plea agreement, it was not “truly
clear” that conviction would render him deportable. Indeed, twelve years passed
before USCIS initiated deportation proceedings. Since the defendant’s convictions
were the result of a single instance in which he was found to be in possession of less
than thirty grams of marijuana, it may have appeared that he would qualify for
discretionary relief. Despite the lack of clarity in the immigration consequences of
the plea agreement, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the defendant had a
viable claim to withdraw his guilty pleas on a theory of ineffective assistance of
counsel.96 Therefore, in New Mexico, a defendant may be able to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to offer advice as to the
immigration consequences of conviction even when those consequences were
unclear. The Ramirez decision affirms the recognition in Favela that New Mexico
courts have gone farther than the U.S. Supreme Court in creating a duty of counsel
to determine the immigration consequences of conviction. In New Mexico, the duty
is not confined to those cases where the consequences are “truly clear.”
Similarly, in the scenario where Jones faces the decision of pleading guilty
to misdemeanor indecent exposure, it is not “truly clear” whether a conviction will
render him registrable as a sex offender in other states. However, if his attorney were
to research other states’ statutes, she would find that a conviction for indecent
exposure, while not a registrable offense in New Mexico, is likely to require Jones

90. Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023, ¶ 3, 333 P.3d 240.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 242 n.1.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
94. Id. § 1182(h) (emphasis added).
95. Petitioner-Respondent’s Answer Brief at 2, Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023, 333 P.3d 240
(No. 33,604), 2013 WL 9873024, at *2.
96. Ramirez, 2014-NMSC-023, ¶ 17.
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to register as a sex offender in some other states.97 In Ramirez, defense counsel’s
performance was deficient in that it failed to address the defendant’s risk under the
INA and the subtlety that disqualified him from a waiver of deportation. Likewise,
in Jones’s case, defense counsel’s performance is deficient if it fails to address other
states’ treatment of indecent exposure as a registrable sex offense. Edwards demands
that Jones’s attorney predict the likelihood that he will have to register as a sex
offender; an equivocal warning, that he may have to register, is not sufficient.
b.

New Mexico cannot expect defense counsel to predict how courts in other
states will interpret clients’ conduct.

Now suppose that, cognizant of other states’ treatment of indecent exposure
as a registrable sex offense, Jones’s attorney negotiates a plea offer on a charge of
disorderly conduct in violation of section 30-20-1 of the New Mexico Criminal
Code.98 Confident that a conviction for disorderly conduct will not require Jones to
register as a sex offender in New Mexico or elsewhere, Jones’s attorney advises him
to accept the offer. Jones does so, but the sexual nature of his conduct remains part
of the record. When Jones moves to North Dakota several years later, the local
attorney general’s office notifies him that he must register as a sex offender.99
In Denault v. State, the petitioner sought declaratory relief from sexoffender registration in North Dakota. 100 He alleged that, upon moving to North
Dakota, the attorney general’s office notified him that his Minnesota conviction
required him to register as a sex offender in North Dakota, even when it did not
require registration in Minnesota.101 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that the lewd exhibition provision of a Minnesota statute102 was equivalent to the
North Dakota crime of indecent exposure,103 a registrable sex offense.104 The court
determined further that a foreign conviction may be registrable in North Dakota even
when the foreign court did not order the defendant to register as a sex offender.105
The Denault court thus held that the defendant’s Minnesota conviction required him
to register as a sex offender upon moving to North Dakota.106 Because the court
determined that the statutes themselves were equivalent, it did not reach the issue of
whether the defendant’s conduct satisfied the elements of the North Dakota
statute.107 However, the court suggested that it would be willing to do so when it

97. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-15(1)(g) (West 2008) (including North Dakota’s
indecent exposure statute, section 12.1-20-12.1, among the state’s enumerated sex offenses).
98. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-1 (2018).
99. Cf. Denault v. State, 2017 ND 167, ¶ 2, 898 N.W.2d 452, 454.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1(2) (West 2010).
103. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-12.1(1) (West 2008).
104. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-15(1)(g) (West 2008) (including section 12.1-20-12.1 among
the state’s enumerated sex offenses).
105. Denault, 2017 ND 167, ¶ 24, 898 N.W.2d 452.
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 23.
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cited the Ohio Supreme Court for the proposition that “a court may go beyond the
statutes and rely on a limited portion of the record in a narrow class of cases.”108
If North Dakota were to follow Ohio, New Mexico, and the few other states
whose courts have endorsed a fact-specific inquiry,109 then Jones’s disorderly
conduct conviction could require him to register as a sex offender in North Dakota.
Jones pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct on the advice of counsel that conviction
would not require him to register as a sex offender. Upon learning that he must
register as a sex offender after all, Jones might seek to withdraw his plea on a theory
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Where an attorney “provides incorrect advice or
misrepresents the consequences of a plea,” counsel’s performance is deficient.110
Since Jones’s attorney incorrectly advised him that he would not have to register as
a sex offender, Jones can establish the first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective
assistance of counsel under New Mexico standards. As to the second prong, Jones
must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”111 New Mexico
courts have followed the U.S. Supreme Court in adopting a broad approach to the
second prong of the Strickland test, reasoning that “the petitioner need only show
‘that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances.’”112 Jones contends that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial
had he known that a conviction under the plea agreement could require him to
register as a sex offender in another state. Assuming he can produce sufficient
evidence to corroborate his contention113 and show that it would have been rational
to so proceed, Jones has a viable claim to withdraw his guilty plea on a theory of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The upshot of the above scenario is that, in some sex-offense cases,
effective assistance requires defense counsel to determine whether other states have
adopted a fact-specific inquiry in equating out-of-state crimes to their enumerated
sex offenses. Such a task, however, is too burdensome a duty to impose on defense
counsel. New Mexico cannot expect defense counsel to become familiar with the
statutes and jurisprudence of each of the fifty states for the purpose of determining
how certain it is that a client will have to register as a sex offender upon moving
elsewhere.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

Standards for effective assistance of counsel help ensure that defendants
enter plea agreements knowingly and voluntarily.114 A successful claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel forces the court to invalidate its prior decision and
108. Id. ¶ 20 (quoting State v. Lloyd, 132 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2012-Ohio-2015, 970 N.E.2d 870, at ¶ 31).
109. See, e.g., North v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Sex Offenders, 871 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (N.Y. 2007); State
v. Howe, 212 P.3d 565, 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
110. State v. Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 7, 345 P.3d 1074.
111. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
112. Tejeiro, 2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 14 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).
113. See id. ¶ 15 (citing Patterson v. LeMaster, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 30, 21 P.3d 1032) (“Corroborating
evidence may include pre-conviction statements or actions that indicate the defendant’s preferences or
intentions.”).
114. See State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d 799.
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try the case anew. Ultimately, ineffective assistance of counsel blemishes the
authority of the court and unduly consumes its resources. Effective assistance of
counsel thus benefits the state as much as it does the defendant.
When a state requires a new resident to register as a sex offender based on
the facts of a conviction from another state, the state risks imposing consequences
that the person did not know of at the time of pleading guilty. The fact-specific
inquiry can thus render the defendant’s plea involuntary and open the door to a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in the court that accepted the plea. In
promulgating a fact-specific inquiry in Hall, the New Mexico Supreme Court has
opened the door to the invalidation of other states’ judgments through successful
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in those states.
a.

New Mexico should depart from the fact-specific inquiry promulgated in
Hall.

To avoid invalidating the decisions of other state courts, New Mexico courts
ought to abandon the fact-specific approach to determining whether a foreign
conviction is equivalent to one of New Mexico’s enumerated sex offenses. In Doe v.
Sex Offender Registry Board, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found it
impermissible to consider the facts underlying an out-of-state conviction in
determining whether it was a “like violation” to one of Massachusetts’s enumerated
sex offenses.115 The court rejected the fact-specific approach for concerns like those
expressed in Part II(b) of this Note. The Massachusetts court reasoned that the factspecific approach allows a state to “transform a crime that does not involve sexual
conduct into a registrable offense.”116 Such a consequence, the court reasoned, was
in direct controversy with the legislative intent behind the “like violation” provision,
which was aimed at treating “sex offenses in the same manner regardless of where
the offenses were committed.”117 Most notably, the court reasoned against the factspecific approach because its adoption could result in the state requiring people to
register as sex offenders when they did not know that their convictions carried such
a risk.118
As discussed above, when a court requires sex-offender registration of a
person who had no opportunity to consider such a consequence at the time of
pleading guilty, the court casts doubt on the validity of the person’s conviction. In
adopting a fact-specific approach to equating out-of-state crimes to its enumerated
sex offenses, New Mexico risks burdening other states with hearing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Application of the fact-specific approach could
result in the successful withdrawal of a defendant’s plea, requiring the forum state to
prosecute the case for a second time or accept a vacated conviction. New Mexico
should not place such a burden on other states. 119

115. Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 925 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Mass. 2010).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 540 & n.4.
119. In theorizing about what New Mexico should demand of other states, I have assumed the standard
for effective assistance of counsel that New Mexico deems best. While some states may have lower
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New Mexico should replace the fact-specific inquiry with deference to
other states’ judgments.

When a comparison of the elements fails to establish an equivalence
between two crimes, the relevant inquiry should be whether the out-of-state
conviction required registration as a sex offender in the forum state—not whether
the defendant’s actual conduct would have amounted to a registrable sex offense had
it occurred in the reviewing state. In Jones’s case, if North Dakota were to take this
approach, there would be no threat to the validity of his New Mexico conviction.
New Mexico’s disorderly conduct statute criminalizes “engaging in violent, abusive,
indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct
which tends to disturb the peace.”120 Indecent exposure is the nearest registrable sex
offense in North Dakota, and it criminalizes (1) exposing “one’s penis, vulva, or anus
in a public place,” with (2) “intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify that person’s lust,
passions, or sexual desires.”121 The North Dakota crime is narrower than the New
Mexico crime in that it criminalizes specific conduct as opposed to broadly
criminalizing conduct that tends to disturb the peace. Moreover, the North Dakota
statute requires a specific mental state, while New Mexico’s disorderly conduct
statute does not. Therefore, the two crimes are not equivalent.
Having failed to establish an equivalence, the court should not proceed by
inquiring into the facts underlying Jones’s conviction because doing so could give
him a viable claim to withdraw his guilty plea in the New Mexico case. The only
relevant inquiry after comparison of the elements should be whether Jones’s
conviction required him to register as a sex offender in New Mexico. This approach
avoids requiring sex-offender registration of people who did not know that their
convictions could have such a consequence, and it closes the door on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of notice.
This proposal does not offer a windfall to dangerous sex offenders. The
elemental comparison, on its own, can be effective in determining whether two
states’ statutes are equivalent. Considering only the elements of the statutes in
question in Doe, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Maine’s
crime of unlawful sexual contact was a like violation to the Massachusetts crime of
indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen.122 Without inquiring into the
defendant’s actual conduct, the court found that his conviction from Maine amounted
to a registrable sex offense in Massachusetts.123 When comparison of the elements
does not establish an equivalence, courts should honor other states’ determinations
as to whether defendants’ conduct warranted sex-offender registration. Doing so
protects the voluntariness of defendants’ pleas and insulates states from hearing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in these cases. This approach also creates
more uniformity in the registration of sex offenders across the fifty states, preventing
standards, I believe that opening the door to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is problematic,
even if the likelihood of the claims’ success depends on the jurisdiction.
120. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-1 (2018).
121. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-12.1(1) (West 2008).
122. Doe, 925 N.E.2d at 536.
123. Id. at 538–40.
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states from becoming more or less attractive to sex offenders based on the way they
compare out-of-state crimes to their enumerated sex offenses.
Arizona has already adopted such an approach. In State v. Kuntz, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that it was improper to consider the facts of an outof-state conviction to determine whether it equated to a registrable sex offense in
Arizona.124 In 2005, Arizona’s legislature amended its sex-offender registration
statute to restrict the comparison of crimes to the elements of each crime and whether
the out-of-state crime required sex-offender registration in the forum state.125
Arizona rejected the fact-specific approach out of concern for defendants’ rights126
and embraced deference to other states to prevent sex offenders from avoiding
registration by moving to Arizona.127 For the reasons discussed above, New Mexico
should recognize the prudence in Arizona’s decision and follow its neighbor in
rejecting the fact-specific inquiry in favor of deference to other states’ judgments.
CONCLUSION
New Mexico should depart from the fact-specific approach to comparing
out-of-state crimes to its registrable sex offenses because the practice could render
those convictions invalid. Instead, when comparison of the elements of each crime
fails to establish an equivalence, New Mexico courts should defer to the other state’s
judgment as to whether an offense warranted sex-offender registration. The proposed
approach avoids imposing the requirements of SORNA on new residents who
accepted plea offers in other states without knowing that they may have to register
as sex offenders. As such, the proposed approach is better adapted than the current,
fact-specific approach to preserve the validity of convictions from other
jurisdictions.

124. State v. Kuntz, 100 P.3d 26, 29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
125. State v. Lowery, 287 P.3d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (summarizing the legislative intent
behind the amendment); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(A) (2010) (requiring registration of
any person with an out-of-state conviction that “has the same elements of an offense listed in this section
or who is required to register by the convicting or adjudicating jurisdiction”).
126. Kuntz, 100 P.3d at 29 (citing State v. Schaaf, 819 P.2d 909, 919–20 (Ariz. 1991)) (“Consideration
of events underlying the foreign conviction that are not necessarily part of the conviction would, in effect,
constitute a prohibited second trial concerning that crime.”).
127. Lowery, 287 P.3d at 835 (citing Kuntz, 100 P.3d at 29–30) (“Prior to 2005 . . . under Arizona law,
one could evade registration if the elements of the respective statutes did not match.”).

